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 ABSTRACT
The European Union’s integration activity and style of governance directed at the public
policy of member states has undergone a major learning process over the last fifteen years. Apart
from using legal means, so-called open methods of coordination have come to the fore, which,
besides – indeed complementing – compulsory adaptation, have asserted incentives based on the
exchange of experiences. In the course of the spread of the European pattern of environmental
protection, the EU has learnt a great deal from its earlier enlargements, and in addition to legal
harmonisation it has allocated substantial resources for the development of the capacity for the
enforcement of the Acquis Communautaire in the new acceding countries.
The adaptational process has not been evenly effective in every dimension of the public
policy in question. While waste management in Hungary has thoroughly fallen into line with the
EU patterns as regards tools – especially legal tools –, the declared objectives of this  policy area
in many cases only pay lip service to the objectives recommended by the EU . This means that
governance has been guided by the infrastructural and material conditions, moreover by govern-
mental traditions  more forcefully than by the declared objectives. During the last 15 years the
government’s environmental institution building has proceeded along a course which in all prob-
ability would have been followed in a similar manner without Hungary’s integration into Europe.
An exception to this is exactly the institutional behaviour patterns which concern multi-level
governance. That is to say, those efforts to mobilise a wide range of tools that seek to harmonise
the interests of different levels of government, economic sectors and civil society have to a large
extent developed in reaction to EU regulations and financing conditions.
However, this proved to be insufficient for the style of the young Hungarian environmental
policy to manage to keep pace with the clear development of tools. Among the reasons for the
uneven performance of government, there are numerous factors that refer to precisely the inade-
quacies of the style of governance, such as the schematic imitation of EU patterns, an unfortunate
choice of centralization patterns, the lack of unison between the ministries, the party political
influence over professional matters, and the ambiguous relationship maintained with the civil
sector.
It is indisputable that in the last decade – in no small measure due to the impact of adapta-
tion to EU integration – Hungarian waste management policy has undergone fundamental re-
forms. The most important driving forces behind these changes have been the adaptation to EU
patterns of the legal system, institutions implementing the law, financing frameworks and plan-
ning activity. As an effect of these adaptation mechanisms and also due to the opening of the
waste management market, behaviour patterns in waste management previously developed in the
EU have spread in the institutions and their networks.
Nevertheless, the positive impacts of these developments appeared in Hungary’s perform-
ance in environmental protection only to a limited extent. The standard of waste management in
Hungary lags well behind the average for EU member states. There are numerous causes of this
underperformance: the expensiveness of running the existing out-dated waste management infra-
structure, the high costs of its modernisation, the legal difficulties of creating the new type of co-
operation networks, institutional incapability, the misinterpreted autonomy of local government,
the supposed and actual distortions of competition observable in the waste management market
and the lack of social capital.
Hungarian waste management policy is centralized but it cannot be regarded as purely a top-
down managed activity: it also includes the continuous relaying and representation of the inter-
ests of micro-level actors. In the style of governance of waste management public policy, the
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multi-levelledness seen as an EU requirement is spreading, yet at the same time patterns of cen-
tralization habitual and familiar in Hungary are also being re-established.
 The style of governance can be considered open if the involvement of businesses and eco-
nomic interest groups as well as civil organisations are already routine. The Hungarian Waste
Management Act passed in 2000 gave the government regulatory responsibility for all types of
waste. The regional organs of the environmental government operate on the basis of strictly en-
forced central considerations. However, for the environmental deficit typical of the country to be
eliminated and to grow up for the tasks of the enforcement of the regulations following from le-
gal harmonisation, measures in organisational development and a great many more resources
than at present are required. The task of the local governments is partly to follow the regulations
and partly to see that others observe them. At the same time implementing waste management
decisions or postponing them is typical in many respects of the activity of the underfinanced lo-
cal governments. In its planning activity the government co-operates closely with the local gov-
ernments, businesses and civil groups.
The Europeanisation of public policy has fundamentally changed the motivational mecha-
nism and scope of action of all waste management actors and those affected by this policy area.
Local conflicts, court cases and referenda related to waste management issues often involve  po-
litical party interests  and often the well-known NIMBY (not in my back yard) motivation is
clearly discernable. Elsewhere, however, as the deposition of waste  is a profitable activity for
public and privately owned landfills in the period studied, the "PIMBY" motivation (that is put in
my back yard) was also widespread. These considerations influence decisions directed at creating
subregional associations operating with EU co-financing as well.
In the Central Hungary Region chosen for the case study the network of relations of gov-
ernmental, private and civil organisations playing a role in waste management is not uniformly
dense. . While influential institutional actors have a central position, others have only managed to
become embedded in the web of market- and bureaucratic relations to a lesser extent. It is char-
acteristic of the core of the government, local government and private organisations in the centre
of the web that their rich network extends to a wide range of ownership, regulation and customer
relations. In contrast with this, the meshing of small local governments and waste management
firms on the periphery of the network is mainly determined by whether they are on the demand or
supply side in the waste management services market. Although certain communities in the re-
gion have undertaken a significant role in accepting waste from Budapest, no distinct trace of this
can be found in the development of the network of institutions. The total impact of civil organi-
sations is modest, but their relations are rich; they work together regularly with almost all kinds
of actors.
The structure of the paper. This paper examines the spreading style of multi-level govern-
ance prevalent in the Europeanisation process in relation to the European adaptation of Hungar-
ian environmental policy. The case study used as an illustration presents the evolution and actor-
specific examination of the waste management of a region. After presenting concepts of political
science and precedents from the European Union, the interactive patterns and networks are de-
scribed which were created between the local public institution structures, the private sector and
civil organisations in the context of European integration, and in particular in the framework of
legal harmonisation and the ISPA programme. The paper then presents the main actors and
problems in waste management in the Central Hungary Region, and reviews the co-operation and
conflicts between regional and local actors, as well as their direct and indirect interconnections
with the process of EU integration.
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EU INTEGRATION MECHANISMS
AFFECTING HUNGARIAN PUBLIC POLICIES
IN THE CASE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT1
INTEGRATION AND THE EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
Conceptual frameworks
The process of Europeanisation is viewed by political scientists as a gradual
transformation which gives new direction and form to national policy and policy-
making by making the European Union’s policy and economic dynamics part of or-
ganisational logic. Most researchers of this phenomenon (Bache 2003) view the Eu-
ropeanisation process by applying the cause and effect paradigm, thus it is inter-
preted as a succession of consequences developing in member states of which the
cause and driving force is the EU’s integration policy. At the same time the member
states are not merely passive recipients of incoming pressure from the EU, but they
convey their national preferences back to the EU. Researchers who believe the EU is
also the product of Europeanisation are in the minority (Wallace 2000). The consen-
sus holds that the adaptational process of nation-states is the result of a certain com-
pulsion or pressure to adapt. In the course of this the depth and the dynamics of the
changes  depend on
• the extent to which there are organisations and supporting institutions with
the right of veto present in the member state in question,
• what sort of organisational- and policy making culture the country has, and
• the extent of the influence and learning ability  of the actors.
The target groups of Europeanisation are individuals, households, businesses and
institutions; i.e. public, private and civil society actors. Adaptation is realised not just
on an institutional level but due to this process the acceptance of European values
and policy paradigms also changes the identity of the actors and the dialogue be-
tween them . The impact varies not simply from country to country but also accord-
ing to policy area, actor type and institution. In addition to the enlargement of the
                                                
1 Prepared within the scope of the EU-5 research programme entitled “EU Enlargement and Multi-
Level Governance in European Regional and Environmental Policies: Patterns of Institutional
Learning, Adaptation and Europeanisation among Cohesion Countries (Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal) and Lessons for New Members (Hungary and Poland)” (ADAPT). 2001–2003. The work of
the international team was coordinated by Christos Paraskevopoulos and Panayotis Getimis
(Greece).
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EU, deepening is also frequently mentioned as a parallel concept, and what is usually
meant by this is the extent to which integration penetrates the member countries.
Research into Europeanisation has recently laid greater stress than before on
bottom-up and horizontal exertion of pressure, on the values and interests of actors,
on the enforcement of regulations combined with voluntary learning, on the identity
of the actors, on the diversity of the impacts and on the dynamics of the process itself
apart from the result (Bache 2003).
It is exciting to pose the question:  which attributes and characteristics of the
public policies of nation-states change as the effect of pressure to Europeanise. In
recent analyses (e.g. Liefferink–Jordan 2002) public policy attributes are usually de-
fined as follows:
• the policy content (that is the paradigms and objectives of the action of the
policy as well as the tools and how they are calibrated)
• the institutional structures
• and the prevailing style of the interactions.
The EU primarily seeks to integrate the content of public policies, but the con-
vergence mechanisms can also affect the structure and style of a policy. In Hungary,
for instance, the stated objectives of environmental policy are in complete unison
with the objectives of the EU, and its tools, especially the system of legal provisions,
can be considered in part Europeanised. Nevertheless, the nature and state of devel-
opment of the institutions, and the style of the interactions between the actors pre-
serve the old governmental traditions, and they only adapt very slowly to Western
European patterns and standards.
Convergence. Describing the phenomenon of Europeanisation would be simple
if it could be characterised merely by the metaphor of convergence. However, sev-
eral researchers believe that applying the convergence theory leads to superficial re-
sults and overall it is not sufficiently refined to describe the complex Europeanisation
patterns developing in each public policy area in the member states. Four types of
convergence mechanisms for the Europeanisation of public policies are distinguished
in specialist literature (See e.g. Liefferink-Jordan 2002 and Bennet 1991):
• imitation founded on foreign experiences;
• impact made through the network of elites, based on common understanding
and learning,
• harmonisation, an internationally accepted process which is based on mutual
dependence and the autonomy of nation-states;
• and penetration, which is based on external compulsion and pressure.
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Based on Hungarian experiences, it can be stated that in the process of the Euro-
peanisation of public policies the harmonisation mechanism based on international
agreements prevails. The mechanisms based on imitation and elite network learning
have been given a role mainly in the preparation of the more significant institutional
reforms. Only Euro-sceptic researchers allege that the penetration mechanism would
have a significant role in the Europeanisation of Hungary (Böröcz 2001).
The “governance” approach emphasises the significance of interaction between
actors and of bargaining  networks in the area of policy-making  as opposed to the
traditional “government” approach. Dictionaries define both terms as “governing,
the action or manner of controlling or regulating”. However,  in recent political sci-
ence literature the increasing use of the term “good governance”, implicitly contrasts
this approach  with the governments’ traditional “top-down” governmental methods
in the centre of which is the rigid interpretation of centrally devised concepts and the
continual appraisal of lower levels of government and of all actors. The
“governance” approach supplements this with accented new elements. The  frequent
appearance of this concept implies that public and private sector and civil society
actors are becoming more and more active in the policy process. At the same time it
needs to be underscored that the more active appearance of non-governmental actors
is not necessarily accompanied by the diffusion of power (Ahonen 2003 and Bache
2003).
Multi-level governance. Political science literature  devotes increasing attention
to this concept as well (See e.g. Hooghe-Marks 2001). It expresses the phenomenon
of an increasing number of powers being transferred from the central state apparatus
to superordinate international as well as subordinate and co-ordinate domestic or-
ganisations. There is no unified view about what sort of model it is practical to base
organising this on. In the course of analysing multi-level governance attention needs
to be paid not only to the transfer of powers (competences) in various directions but
also to the right of institutions to levy and dispose of taxes as well as the decentrali-
sation of formal and informal relations in the exercise of power. One of the principal
dimensions of the division of power is realisable through regional levels, while the
division of power through forms of ownership, legal formulae and economic sectors
shade and interlace the basic texture.
The current level of the multi-levelled nature of governance in the European
Union is indicated by the fact that the regions can establish direct relations with the
central organs of the European Union, as international organisations, bypassing cen-
tral government. Specifically in the area of environmental protection, the decision-
making competence of central governments is also restricted by international agree-
ments, regional autonomies and powers delegated to NGOs.
Open methods of co-ordination. This phrase covers a portfolio of methods of
governance which helps to bridge the coordinational difficulties accompanying the
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introduction of multi-level governance. In EU practice in the course of the harmoni-
sation of the different public policies of member states the means of command and
persuasion are fused in a peculiar manner:
• on the one hand the laying down of common objectives and principles, and
the formulation of quantitative and qualitative objectives for member states
are prescribed,
• while on the other – dependent on the policy area – co-operation, the ex-
change of best practices, the devising of action plans for member states, the
monitoring of progress at regular intervals, and the comparison of member
states’ efforts are not so much prescribed but rather encouraged.
Networks. It is a widely accepted perception that the competitiveness of the re-
gions and the success of planning and implementing public policies is determined not
so much by the good qualities of individual institutions and businesses than by the
richness of their relationships, and by the viability and harmony of networks created
by the institutional actors. Over the last decade representatives of sociology, and
within this of institutional sociology, have also joined the school that researches the
significance of networks in the most diverse disciplines of the natural and social sci-
ences (See Barabási 2002 and Paraskevopoulos 2001). Researching the density of
relations, centralisation and the structure of networks created by public service, busi-
ness and civil actors fits in well with the productive sociological paradigm of social
network analysis (SNA) developed during the last decade. The quantitative analysis
of personal and institutional networks is appears as an ever more widespread method
in the examination of economic co-operation, the impact of policies and the spread of
innovations (See e.g. Letenyei 2000).
Network building is also a tried and tested adaptation strategy in most organisa-
tions during the course of Europeanisation. The enrichment of the structure of the
social and institutional networks created by community actors enables information
flow and creates confidence, thereby reducing the costs of market transactions, pro-
moting exchange, and increasing the possibilities of co-operation in the risky process
of Europeanisation and innovation; network building also leads to positive economic
consequences, and facilitates local and regional development. In particular,  local de-
velopment policies can be elaborated and implementd more effectively in  close co-
operation between the public sector and private actors. On the other hand closely knit
networks can also play negative roles is they become the means of avoiding compe-
tition or if they serve the reduction of  individual autonomies; in such cases they can
discourage the spirit of development and thus decrease efficiency. In extreme cases
excessively strong networks may lead to protectionism, the development of a politi-
cal client system, or even corruption and economic criminality. However, most re-
searchers agree that there is a need for measures that promote the creation and devel-
opment of co-operative networks between institutional actors through legal, organi-
sation developmental and financial support (Triglia 2001).
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Social Network Analysis. Apart from the verbal, descriptive approaches applied
in the most varied network analysis contexts, quantitative methods based on exact
empiria have also appeared. Social Network Analysis (SNA) examines how actors
are embedded in the system of relations and assess the characteristics of this network
on a mathematical basis with computer support (Scott, 1991).
Social capital – as a feature or resource of a community – is a concept that is in-
creasingly used in explaining the variability of the success in Europeanisation proc-
esses. This term expresses in an integrated manner the common values and commit-
ments of the actors, together with their positive traditions and ability to co-operate,
the extent of which closely depends on the ability of the local institutional system to
adapt and learn. International organisations acknowledge that the general feeling of
well-being in a society and the growth of the economy closely depend on  factors
comprising social capital (OECD 2001).
The EU places ever greater emphasis on "open" methods of governance
In 2001 the European Union issued a White Paper on methods of European gov-
ernance (European Governance – a White Paper 2001). The document is addressed
not only to the central administration of the EU but also to the current and acceding
member states, and their regions, towns and civil societies. The aim of the initiative
is to increase the openness, flexibility and accountability of the policy process, and
improve the quality and efficiency of regulation.
The White Paper
• criticises the slowness and inflexibility of integrating the Acquis Com-
munautaire into the legal system of the member states,
• emphasises that social networks (the relations of businesses, local govern-
ments, research centres and communities) can effectively improve EU poli-
cies,
• draws attention to the fact that the wide-ranging involvement of experts and
the preparation of risk analyses and impact assessments related to the Acquis
Communautaire and its application can improve the quality and efficiency of
regulation, and increase its transparency,
• promotes the involvement of the representatives of civil society -  i.e. the
churches, trade unions, employers’ organisations -  in interest conciliation and
decision-making at an even more intensive level than at present,
• lays down that the culture of dialogue needs to be strengthened and thus ac-
cepts a code of conduct of consultation in the law-making and policy process.
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According to the White Paper, accepting and harmonising legislation is merely
one element of spreading European solutions; in addition to this, other non-binding
tools should also be given a role, thus proposals, guidelines on application and
framework agreements enabling autonomously devised solutions.
The document makes special mention of when and how the Community can ap-
ply the so-called Open Methods of Coordination (OMC). In projects that can be typi-
fied by OMC, vertical and horizontal coordination is combined with the experimen-
tation of nation-states, EU-level monitoring and the publicizing of successful solu-
tions. The aim of these methods is to create a framework for policy learning by the
application of guidelines given by central organs, standards, and benchmarking tech-
niques. OMC are a promising means of identifying and monitoring common objec-
tives because they clearly acknowledge national diversity and transform the Euro-
pean Union into a natural laboratory for policy experimentation. In particular,
through their use the multi-level governance of federal systems can be improved. At
the same time OMC make new demands for the development of decentralised and
vertical coordination, and make a new institutional design necessary.
OMC are not intended to replace, but rather to complement, traditional legisla-
tive and implementation processes. They should primarily be used where the EU
treaties can only be applied in a limited manner, where there is a lack of consensus
for the use of binding directives, and in policy areas which are too complex to be
well harmonised on a European level (Overdevest 2002, Zeitlin 2002).
Since their appearance in 2000 OMC have run a successful course in the practice
of European policy-making. In close-to-life experiments they have proved them-
selves to be suitable for bringing to the surface what works well in solving public
policy problems and what does not. The prototypes for the OMC consist of the entry
requirements for the single market and the European Monetary Union, as well as the
implementation of the European Employment Strategy (EES).
The White Paper attaches a major priority to not just the legal steps that should
be taken against those who infringe community law, but also to reviewing those ar-
eas of the body of law that are difficult to apply, analysing the reasons for this, con-
tinuously monitoring the coherence of national and community law and, within the
framework of institutional co-operation, to developing the most successful tools for
legal enforcement.
Open methods had also been present in EU governance beforehand and the
White Paper only shifted the emphasis to a certain extent. The EU’s policies that did
not have legally binding tools – for example, small and medium-sized business de-
velopment policy – have always used more vigorously open means (e.g. recommen-
dations, intergovernmental exchange of experiences realised during benchmarking
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and twinning projects, and so-called “processes” formulating actual objectives,
which bore the names of the cities staging the initiating conferences) (Futó 1999).
The White Paper provoked a lively debate. Critics pointed out that overempha-
sising the rights of interest groups could lead to "overloading" the processes of EU
democracy (See Greenwood 2002). Today there are already over 1.400 registered
interest groups and almost 20.000 interest representations involved in forming Euro-
pean Union policy. For this reason the critics believe it would be timely to examine
and accredit interest groups,  to make dialogue between the regulated and the regu-
lators more organised in order to avoid the dilution of the interest reconciliation pro-
cess. Critics likewise condemn the fact that in projects and studies mapping best
practices laggard countries are too sharply censured (Porte 2001).
Learning process in the EU’s environmental protection diplomacy
Major changes have occurred in the European Union’s international environ-
mental protection diplomacy since the accession of Spain in 1986 (Christiansen-
Tangen 2001). At Spain’s accession negotiations the EU only insisted that Spain ac-
cepted the EU’s environmental protection regulations and integrated them into its
own legal system. This requirement at that time did not involve aspects which would
draw attention to the fact that the implementation of the regulations in question could
be obstructed by institutional deficiencies or lack of funds.
In the following one and half decades, however, the EU’s position vis-à-vis
newly acceding countries changed completely. The environmental problems of East-
ern European countries represented a greater challenge to the EU than in previous
waves of accession. This is because firstly the state of the environment was far worse
here, secondly the amount of environmental protection legislation has grown signifi-
cantly in the meantime, reaching 300, and thirdly in the intervening one and a half
decades it has become clear to the EU that if the details of the environmental protec-
tion chapter of accession are not duly drawn up, significant subsequent costs can be
incurred by the EU. The EU also recognised that the administrative structures of en-
vironmental protection in the acceding countries required reinforcing.
Compared to the earlier waves of accession there was a major difference in that
in Central and Eastern Europe the environmental protection projects of the EU’s pre-
accession aid programmes (Phare, ISPA) were instructive from the point-of-view of
how successfully the supported countries managed to use the financial aid earmarked
for environmental protection. Moreover, the EU in the meantime has recognised  that
the pace of environmental integration is  determined to a large extent by the slowest
and most reluctant country.
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Due to these developments the EU produced a threefold set of requirements in
Central and Eastern Europe, so that applicant countries had to satisfy not only (a) le-
gal requirements of environmental protection but also had to find answers to (b) in-
stitutional and (c) financial challenges. The integration strategy thus went far beyond
requiring merely the formal transfer of rules of law, and a significant amount of en-
ergy was invested in elaborating institution building and financial measures in order
to avoid the so-called “implementation deficit”.
Thus the policy of adaptation goes far beyond legal harmonisation, as attention
has to be devoted to social interests and conflicts influencing actual decision-making
in every acceding country. Due to the different past and political structure of the
newly acceding countries, the European Union had to change not only its methods,
but also the nature of its own institutions (Fiala 2001).
More intensive Europeanisation in methods and institutions than in objectives
and style
One case study examined the quality and quantity of the impact of the European
Union on the environmental policy of member states, and through what mechanisms
this impact was effected (Liefferink–Jordan 2002). The authors defined the Europe-
anisation process simply as the impact of European integration on the policy-making
processes and the policies of member states. The question was also posed of whether
it was at all possible to describe this process of decades as convergence, and thus
whether member states are proceeding in the same direction in the area of environ-
mental policy. Another question was whether these changes have general trends valid
for all member states. The counterhypothesis proposes that the top-down impact
from Brussels has a different effect in the context of each nation-state.
Methodological paradox. Research into Europeanisation here – and also in the
case of the adaptation of all other actual policy areas – is made difficult by a general
paradox of impact assessments. According to this (Liefferink–Jordan 2002 and
Goetz, 2000), Europeanisation research is nothing other than a search for the effect
(impact) belonging to a cause; – but as soon as the impact becomes clear in some
detail, suddenly several similarly probable competitors appear around the original
cause, which also have a rightful claim themselves to being the causes of the ob-
served impact. Applying the paradox to EU integration, the question arises: if con-
vergence does occur, how can it be proved that it was caused by Europeanisation?
Environmental policy is the EU’s most developed area of competence, which
over the last 30 years has covered an ever greater number of topics and policy areas
related to the environment. At the start of the integration process the majority of the
community’s member states already had more or less developed environmental poli-
cies, and so convergence or the lack of it was more or less observable for researchers.
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The research extended to ten member states (Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). In each
country a national study was made which outlined the effectiveness of the EU envi-
ronmental policy.
The results were as follows.
• As regards the objectives of environmental policy, it was shown that the ac-
ceptance of modern environmental protection principles (for example, instead
of just diminishing pollution, its cause as far as possible should be elimi-
nated) was faster and more obvious in EU member states that had had a more
progressive orientation towards environmental protection from the start. This
placed something of a question mark over the intensity of the EU-specific
impact.
• As regards the methods of environmental policy, the impact of the EU was
more clearly discernable. Thus, for example, in the area of the methods of
measuring the emission of pollution and various environmental procedures
(impact assessments, offering access to environmental information, environ-
mental management) stronger convergence was perceivable than in the area
of the objectives. Furthermore, with the aid of directives environmental stan-
dards for numerous products and technologies were unified.
• As regards the institutional structure of the policy, here the strongest conver-
gence was perceptible in the institutions of nation-states that have working
relations with the central EU organisations. These are usually central imple-
menting organisations, such as the environment ministries, whose units re-
sponsible for EU adaptation have come out of the process in a strengthened
position. While several member states took steps for the regional decentrali-
sation of environmental policy decisions, the obligation to apply community
aspects began an unavoidable centralization process. Simultaneously with
this, legal harmonisation reduced the influence of national parliaments in
making environmental law. At the same time the EU broadened the possibili-
ties for NGOs, which used Brussels as a lever in their policies. The EU also
intervened in the conciliation and coordination policy of certain member
states in the area of environmental protection, but basically it did not question
the traditional methods of the bargaining process in forming regulations.
• As regards the style of the national environmental policy, this was not greatly
influenced by European integration, and consequemtly countries where envi-
ronmental policy had been greener or more preventive in nature, have re-
tained these attributes.
Thus convergence mechanisms largely affected the policy content, in particular
through the harmonisation mechanism, while imitation, the example of elite net-
works and penetration worked less well (Liefferink-Jordan 2002). The impact of the
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EU is thus an “interweaving” of the the national environmental policies with  its own
blue and yellow threads , mainly through its influence on standards, ministries, par-
liaments and the status of NGOs. Moreover, it “ironed out” those creases which arose
following the inception of modern environmental policies in the 1960s. For example,
the exclusive use of certain implementation methods was abandoned or the range of
private and regional actors involved in conciliation was expanded. Thus the EU has
changed in essence neither the fundamental content nor the pattern of the fabric of
the member states’ environmental policies, and the environmental policies did not
converge in the direction of a single model by any means. It is likely that if the con-
vergence mechanisms do not change, the acceding countries will not perceive the
changes as if put into a European straitjacket, and indeed, alongside the phenomena
of Europeanisation, environmental solutions and approaches of one or the other of
the acceding countries may actually spread within the old member states.
IMPACT MECHANISMS FOR CLOSING THE GAP WITH THE EU IN HUNGARIAN WASTE
MANAGEMENT
In the next two sections we shall examine how the learning process that has
taken place in the EU’s environmental policy occurs in Hungary in one of environ-
mental protection’s most sensitive policy areas, waste management. Attention is fo-
cused on the following issues:
• How does Europeanisation affect Hungarian environmental policy? Through
which institutions and which of their networks does it spread? How and
through which mechanisms is it enforced and what sort of institutional learn-
ing processes does it induce?
• How multi-levelled is Hungarian environmental governance, and what impact
has EU adaptation had on it?
• Which form of EU adaptation has succeeded best: imitation, harmonisation or
penetration, and in what sense can convergence be talked about?
• Which attributes of governance has been most affected by EU adaptation:
objectives, methods, institutions or style of governance?
Harmonisation of the legal system
Legal harmonisation is EU adaptation’s most formal and classic mechanism in
the course of which the legal instruments of the public policy in question are trans-
formed in accordance with the requirements of the Acquis Communautaire.
Hungary undertook to adjust its ecological policy and laws to conform with EU
standards pursuant to the Treaty of Association as early as the beginning of the 90s.
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Over the last decade the co-operation between the Hungarian and EU authorities has
been continuous as regards environmental protection. The EU’s annual country re-
ports assessed Hungary’s varying results in environmental protection. During the last
decade Hungarian environmental regulations were continuously and in all details
harmonised with EU legislation. Regulations conforming to the most important EU
standards have already been built into the legal system.
The cornerstones of this development are as follows:
• The Environmental Protection Act. Act 53 of 1995 on the general regulations
for the protection of the environment lays down the comprehensive system of
requirements related to protecting the environment, and the economic tools
for environmental protection as well as clarifying the obligations of the vari-
ous major  actors.
• The National Environmental Protection Programme. Devising the 1997-2002
National Environmental Protection Programme took place in accordance with
Parliament’s decision no. 83/1997. The National Environmental Protection
Programme takes into consideration the EU enlargement document for Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, the EU’s Fifth Action Programme and the plan of
action for the environment entitled Agenda 21.
• Government Programmes. The Government Programme for the period be-
tween 1998 and 2000 introduced the legal harmonisation programme with the
aim of fully conforming with EU legislation in terms of Hungarian environ-
mental law   by 2002. The National Programme for the Acceptance of the
Acquis Communautaire defined objectives, deadlines for the legal harmoni-
sation, and requirements for institution building and implementation as well
as assessed the costs of harmonisation and detailed their financial sources
broken down into the central budget, the private sector and local authorities.
• The Waste Management Act. Hungarian waste management’s basic legal
document is Act XLIII of 2000 on waste management, which is already in
harmony with the EU Waste Framework Directive no. 75/442. The Act to-
gether with the instructions on implementation issued by the ministries in ac-
cordance with the Act clarifies the rights and obligations of all types of actors
in waste management. The Ministry of the Environment was only given
greater responsibility in relation to communal waste pursuant to the provi-
sions of this Act, as previously waste management issues belonged to the lo-
cal governments and to certain regional level public administration organisa-
tions regulating construction. The Act has replaced a previous set of waste
management regulations which were lacunary and out-dated.
• Environmental accession negotiations. The environmental chapter of the ac-
cession negotiations between the EU and Hungary was completed in June
2001. According to estimates the harmonisation costs of only this chapter of
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negotiation came to HUF 2.500 billion (approx. 10 billion Euros). Hungary
was granted derogation from only four EU regulations. According to the
agreement, the EU inspects the range, content and quality of implementation
of the harmonised environmental protection regulations, and in case of non-
conformance the European Supreme Court is entitled to impose a punishment
on the Hungarian government. Of the derogations from EU legislation, two
concern waste management: the requirements of EU Directives related to
waste incineration and the recycling of packaging materials do not have to be
fulfilled by the time of Hungary’s accession to the EU.
Results and deficiencies. The results of legal harmonisation to date are signifi-
cant. By 2002 the majority of EU legislation and standards related to environmental
protection had been accepted. Environmental policies are mainly grounded on the
use of economic regulation and market-conform tools, and their realisation has been
accompanied by a large number of environment-oriented projects. At the same time,
most of the problems encountered during legal harmonisation arise from the lack of
coordination between the institutions of the respective policy areas and the uneven
speed of the adaptation of government organisations. The adaptation process is
slowed down by the facts that  the system of lower level implementation decrees
have been divided between the competent ministries without adequate harmonisation
and that  numerous local government decrees necessary for their implementation are
still lacking.
Implementing the law and institution building
To ensure that rules of law do not remain simply written requirements, the insti-
tutional capacity and organisational culture needs to be developed. In the Europeani-
sation of environmental protection the greatest challenge is posed by the application
of law, that is the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulation, and
its pre-condition: improving the environmental protection institutional system. How-
ever, modern legal enforcement is hindered by inconsistent political decisions, by the
lack of resources and information, moreover  by the deficiencies of political culture
and of environmental awareness.
The Hungarian environmental protection and nature conservancy policy was
raised to a ministerial level in April 1988. Since the parliamentary elections in 2002
environmental protection issues have again been dealt with by the same ministry as
water management. The institutional decentralisation in waste management was
brought about by the change of political regime in 1989 and here the impact of EU
integration cannot be shown directly. The environmental protection agencies are in
fact units of the ministry and work under its strict supervision.
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In the course of the integration process, while implementing environmental pro-
tection legislation, the requirements concerning the medium-level institutional
structures under the national level are increasing. Various tasks and responsibilities
which used to belong to central government organs were transferred from the na-
tional level to local governments, and to regional and local levels of decentralised
government agencies. The capacity of these organisations, however, is limited both
as regards resources and expertise.
The aim of numerous  projects of the PHARE programme was the modernisation
of the institutional structure of environmental protection. The purpose of many in-
stitution building campaigns was precisely to help introduce the EU’s environmental
legislation and to transfer the member states’ experiences. The first wave of these
programmes started in 1988-89 when experts delegated by the EU prepared feasibil-
ity studies, and made IT and organisational development proposals. Later their sup-
port was manifested more and more in the financing of investments, and then from
the end of the 1990s the investment programmes gave way to the so-called twinning
programmes in the framework of PHARE. Within the framework of these pro-
grammes, EU experts arrived from national environmental protection agencies and
implemented actual projects in Hungary.
Waste management planning
Waste management planning is one of the most important coordination mecha-
nisms of multi-level governance as at the same time as the plans are prepared, a kind
of informal bargaining occurs between public administration levels, the economic
interest groups and the civil sector. The preparation of plans is an element of key im-
portance prescribed by EU environmental law, which the Hungarian environmental
policy has also adopted.
The National Waste Management Plan was passed by Parliament in 2002.
Drafting the Plan was preceded by a broad interest reconciliation process. Among its
aims are the recycling of half the packaging materials by after 2005 and that after
2008 landfills can only accept waste which can neither be recycled nor incinerated.
The implementation of the Plan between 2002 and 2008 involves an expense of HUF
360 billion (1.4 billion Euros). The government intends to finance one third of this
from EU ISPA funds.
The work is hierarchically organised as subsequently regional, county and local
waste management plans, in part of a compulsory and in part of a recommended na-
ture, will also be prepared. The waste management plans influence decisions made
by administrative bodies, and determine the basis for implementing projects, and thus
their impact extends to all waste producers and organisations dealing with the col-
lection, elimination and utilization of waste. Waste management projects which do
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not conform with these plans cannot be financed from environmental funds. Planning
work is largely the task of the environmental protection apparatus. This involves
new, hereto unknown and non-customised work which is not so much official work
but rather a series of interest reconciliation measures and management tasks.
EU supported development programmes for the waste management infrastruc-
ture
The objectives and means of programmes co-financed by the EU have been de-
fined in a way so as to force co-operation between groups in the public, private and
civil sectors. These projects can only be realised through public-private partnership
(PPP), that is by creating an alliance of the local governments of nearby communities
with each other and with private waste treatment companies.
The Community financially supports the process of complying by  Hungary's
obligations arising from EU membership. Jointly with Hungarian government actors,
it co-finances important projects of modernising the infrastructure of environmental
protection, and ensures material and professional resources for the implementation of
legal harmonisation, and the introduction of changes in environmental policy. Al-
ready a number of waste management projects have been co-financed by EU grants.
In the course of the 90s the efficient and transparent institutional conditions of
the community financing of environmental investments were created. A system of
institutions receiving moneys from EU pre-accession funds was gradually estab-
lished. In the first years following the change of regime most EU support was pro-
vided by the PHARE programme, which also supported many environmental protec-
tion projects. This programme is gradually being phased out and replaced by the
ISPA and SAPARD pre-accession programmes. Almost half of the resources of the
ISPA programme is devoted to protecting the environment.
Although the support programmes help in financing new investments, the annual
operational costs of the infrastructure created as a result must be paid by the local
governments and their private business partners. For this reason such projects often
produce either contractually based proprietary co-operations between the beneficiary
local governments or PPPs involving the infrastructure-owner local governments and
the infrastructure-operator private companies.
Due to coordination problems and the lack of local resources, a relatively long
time is devoted to organisation and planning of projects as compared to actually
building these facilities. Another unfavourable phenomenon is that, because of the
forceful lobbies of local and sectoral interest groups, environmental projects are of-
ten aimed at areas with questionable priority thus leading to lower environmental
performance.
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In the framework of the ISPA programme the EU has planned in the years 2000-
03 to support the development of 12 integrated waste management systems across
Hungary. In fact in 2002 six integrated waste management projects were in the proc-
ess of realisation in the country, each of which will be able to accept waste from sev-
eral dozen communities2. The programmes typically embrace the building of a series
of regionally scattered waste management infrastructure (waste collection, compost-
ing, selection and transport capacities) at the centre of which is the development of a
high-capacity, modern, central landfill.
THE DOMESTIC SCENES OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN WASTE MANAGEMENT
The development of conciliation between the regional levels of public admini-
stration
The formulation of regulations for waste management is the duty of the central
government and, in the course of this, agreement must be reached with EU institu-
tions. The lower levels of public administration and regional development may par-
ticipate in the bargaining process prior to the making of regulations but they receive
a more significant role in the sharing of funds and in the implementation of legisla-
tion, as well as supervising the application of the law.
The regions as official bodies are among the least significant actors in regulating
the waste management market. Nevertheless, they influence the sharing of funds
from the EU and Hungarian central budget, and thus they can have a great impact on
the investment decisions in waste management infrastructure. Their key development
documents, the so called regional strategic plans usually take waste management as-
pects into account, and in the framework of complex waste management programmes
make provisions about establishing regional landfills, waste recycling programmes,
the recultivation of filled, uncontrolled landfills, and assessing and stopping illegal
dumping sites.
The counties’ waste management role has been gradually decreased in spite of
the fact that pursuant to effective legislation the county self-governments are obliged
to take part in waste management development, satisfying the environmental aspect
within the territory of their county. County self-governments can also prepare a
waste treatment plan but this is not compulsory. If they do, however, they must coor-
dinate local waste management plans, promote the demarcation of joint waste treat-
ment areas of local governments, and co-operate with other county self-governments
in the implementation of waste management tasks.
                                                
2 Two of these subregional projects fall within the area of the Central Hungary Region examined in
detail below.
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The city of Budapest is a special unit in the solution of the waste issue. The
capital produces the highest quantity of waste per capita in the country. Budapest’s
landfills are situated in the capital’s agglomeration, which means there is a signifi-
cant flow of waste from the centre to the periphery. The incineration of solid waste
also creates conflicts between the capital and the agglomeration. The country’s larg-
est waste incinerator, which is owned by the Municipality of Budapest, is in the
capital, but causes air pollution taken by prevailing winds to neighbouring commu-
nities. The legal pressure from these communities contributes to the realisation of an
environment-friendly solution at the waste incinerator (more effective off-gas filters).
The Mayor’s Office of Budapest is at one and the same time the owner and the big-
gest client of Hungary’s largest waste management company, the FKF Rt.
The local governments have to shoulder the greatest responsibility for the loca-
tion of communal solid waste produced in their community. They provide waste
management services either by a local public service company in their own owner-
ship, or through a private or possibly mixed ownership company. Waste management
is only one of the many policy areas where the obligations of the local governments
do not correspond with their funds. The Waste Management Act (2000) and the Na-
tional Waste Management Plan (2002) made this fact even more visible  by pre-
scribing that all landfills lacking modern sealing must be closed, compelling local
governments to handle organic solid waste separately, and to check the compliance
of locally owned landfills. In practice the local governments ignore these statutes,
and the government has no means of intervening to encourage law-abiding behav-
iour. Local government associations often condemn the fact that the government
does not provide funds commensurate with their obligations.
The development of conciliation with economic interest groups
In Hungary from the mid-nineties increasingly greater stress was laid on co-
operation between the private sector and the government in the framework of legal
harmonisation. In drafting legislation government environmental protection organs
have developed the practice of social conciliation whereby the interested parties are
usually questioned  separately. Experiences show that this way more serious added
value and a more useful set of principles is obtained from the actors than by sitting
down with the representatives of all stakeholders around the same table.
The acceptance of regulations related to waste and waste management plans is
today always preceded by conciliation and a bargaining process. Governmental or-
gans send draft plans on the basis of a list to those affected: interest representations,
trade unions and chambers, for facts and opinions, and these organisations are also
invited to ministerial or interministerial forums. The form of co-operation with gov-
ernmental organs in many cases is an impact assessment prepared by professional
organisations. Big business interest groups (such as the Confederation of Hungarian
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Employers and Industrialists) established environmental protection working com-
mittees, and the members of their specialist networks are corporate experts. Thus
over several years the conception of the Waste Management Act and the National
Waste Management Plan was negotiated and agreed, and in this process conferences
and other forums also played a role.
However, the possibility for businesses to enforce their interests did not stop at
that. In practice it has been established that if companies cannot be reconciled with
an official decision, they routinely turn to political intermediaries: to representatives
of the Parliament and to political decision makers such as Secretaries of State.
Within the economic interest groups, waste management companies and waste
treatment enterprises form a separate sector from the viewpoint of waste manage-
ment. If smaller and specialist companies are also taken into account, throughout
Hungary there are over 1.400 companies dealing with waste collection, deposition,
utilization, transport, and processing or treating hazardous waste. These services are
partly in private ownership, the larger usually owned by foreign investors, while the
other part comprises waste treatment enterprises either in partial or full public own-
ership, which are closely connected to their client local governments.
While the association of publicly owned waste management companies dates
back to decades, lately the privately owned waste utilization and waste treatment
companies have also formed their own trade associations. These lobby groups inten-
sively represent their interests at various government and local government levels in
areas such as rule-making, choice of public and private investment strategies, and the
application of funds from domestic, foreign, private and central budgetary sources.
There is lively competition between landfills in the course of which the operators
and owners of the facilities (including local governments) compete to obtain waste
produced in a specific area in order to achieve cost efficiency for the landfill. Due to
the distinctive features of regulation and the waste management market in Hungary,
the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome is supplemented by what can be called
the PIMBY (Put In My Back Yard) syndrome. This acronym in the domestic envi-
ronment means that landfill owners, both public and private, compete for waste to be
put in their landfills.
The interest of private waste treatment companies is the further liberalisation of
the waste management services market, and the introduction of freer competition in
those  local markets where companies in local government ownership are still in a
monopoly position. A few privately owned waste management companies consider
themselves the losers in EU integration due to the EU financed waste management
programmes, as these programmes give their publicly owned rivals an advantage.
Another competitive disadvantage is that the publicly owned companies are much
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closer to the managerial and investment decisions of their main clients, the local
governments.
One of the conditions of the Europeanisation of waste management is that the
several thousand landfills now operating in Hungary will be reduced to at least one
tenth the present number which, however, will have to conform with the require-
ments for modern landfills. The number, capacity and optimal geographical location
of the landfills to be created is currently being debated. This debate typically has
companies already with a landfill on the one side and local governments without
such a facility on the other. Opinions are greatly influenced by the former invest-
ments of the actors.
The development of conciliation with the population and with civil organisations
Since the mid-nineties the institutional system of  public hearings and other fo-
rums designed to  express citizen's opinion  has developed gradually. Numerous laws
adopted on the EU pattern prescribe the involvement of citizens in the decision proc-
ess; such are the acts on environmental impact assessment or on the prevention of
integrated pollution. Similarly, if Phare or ISPA support is earmarked for an envi-
ronmental project, the opinion of the public concerned must be sought by the benefi-
ciary organisations and the results must be documented. Local communities often use
these opportunities and occasionally obstruct  the realisation of planned investments.
In other cases, however, the role of public forums is insignificant and are only a for-
mality.
In the course of social conciliation, decision-makers regularly listen to the opin-
ion of environmental protection organisations despite widespread beliefs  that  opin-
ions of such NGOs often  overemphasise the possibilities of  prohibiting and oblig-
ing, and do not take into account economic tools and the economic consequences of a
measure. Contact between the environmental government and the green movements
is not regular enough although the framework for conciliation was created a long
time ago.
The activities of the green movements are hindered by financial and legal prob-
lems and the lack of volunteers. Local governments fail to assess which environ-
mental tasks could be assigned to the local civil movements, but it must be admitted
that often civil movements would not be capable of doing them. On the other hand
most local civil movements are typically more prepared as regards European regula-
tion than the regionally competent local government.
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CASE STUDY: SURVEY IN THE REGION CENTRAL HUNGARY
Besides reviewing the Europeanisation process in the Hungarian waste manage-
ment sector, the  research has also analysed the behaviour of various main  actors in
the process and mapped the actually formed networks of relations through a survey
of an actual  regional survey using in-depth interviews and questionnaires.
Survey of the actors in waste management policy
In the framework of the survey structured interviews have been made with 32 in-
stitutional actors in waste management in the Central Hungary Region, public insti-
tutions, companies and civil organisations. When necessary several individuals
within the same institution were questioned.
Subject matter of the interviews. Interviews have covered  the following areas:
• The network of relations of the organisation in question with other organisa-
tions and institutions;
• The appearance of EU integration mechanisms in the organisation in ques-
tion, and their impacts on the organisations’ network;
• The processes of adaptation and learning in the organisation in question.
Sample from the population of actors. In selecting the actors interviewed  (insti-
tutions, companies, organisations) an important consideration was that they should
represent every major type of stakeholder including  government and local govern-
ment institutions, actors of the private and civil sectors in the field of waste manage-
ment in the Central Hungary Region. Actors were classified  as follows:
• About half of the institutions questioned represented the central, regional,
subregional, capital and local administration, with special regard to the repre-
sentatives of the environmental government. The sample contained a territo-
rially representative sample of the local governments of the region.
• A significant part of the institutions questioned were actors from the private
sector. Among the respondents there was a representative sample by activity
of the region’s active waste management companies and their alliances. Be-
sides the representatives of waste producing companies these are mainly en-
terprises that perform their waste treatment services mostly on behalf of local
governments. The larger waste treatment companies are usually owned by
larger communities or foreign owners and are mostly the Hungarian subsidi-
ary of a holding company operating in an EU member state.
• Some other organisations questioned belong to the civil sector; these are envi-
ronmental protection groups dealing with waste management issues.
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Table 1
Interviews made in the framework of the research
Government in-
stitutions
 Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water Management
(ISPA Department and Waste Management Department, Budapest),
Central Danube Region Environmental Protection Agency (Buda-
pest).
County self- gov-
ernment
 Pest County Council’s Environmental Management Office (Buda-
pest).
Regional devel-
opment institu-
tions
 "Pro Regio" Agency: Central Hungary Development and Services
Public Benefit Company. (Budapest).
Subregional asso-
ciations of local
governments
 South Buda Region’s Regional Development Local Government
Association (Budakeszi), Zsámért - Zsámbék Basin Regional De-
velopment Association (Biatorbágy).
Local govern-
ments
 Aszód, Municipality of Budapest’s Public Utility Department (Bu-
dapest), Budakeszi, Csömör, Gödöllő, Pusztazámor, Solymár,
Zsámbék.
Waste manage-
ment companies
 FKF Rt., Budapest Municipal Waste Company (Budapest) , Ökoviz
Kft. (Cegléd), VÜSZI Kft. (Gödöllő), Ceszolg Kft. (Cegléd), ASA
Hungary Kft. (Gyál), Biofilter Kft. (Budaörs), Doppstadt Kft.
(Zsámbék), Ereco Co. (Budapest), Pyrus-Rumpold Kft. (Budapest-
Aszód), Becker Kft. (Érd), Mózes Kft. (Cegléd), Selective Waste
Utilization Kft. (Tura), Rumpold Bicske Kft. (Bicske).
Trade associa-
tions, entrepre-
neurs’ interest
representations
 Association of Private Communal Waste Management Companies
(Budapest), Public Hygiene Society (Gárdony), National Associa-
tion of Waste Utilizers (Budapest), Confederation of Hungarian
Employers and Industrialists (Budapest).
Environmental
protection and
nature conser-
vancy associa-
tions
 Humus - Waste Work Association (Budapest), Zsámbék Basin Na-
ture Conservancy Association (Perbál).
Description of the selected region from the environmental aspect
The selected case study region  Central Hungary includes the 1,8 million-strong
capital and the surrounding Pest county, home of 1 million people. The region ap-
propriately illustrates the centre-periphery relation as regards environmental issues.
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At the same time, it must be noted that the Central Hungary Region, which is rela-
tively small, densely populated and centralised compared to the other six regions of
Hungary, is not typical inasmuch as the conflicts between actors appear to be sharper
here than in other areas of the country. The capital produces a large amount of waste
but does not have an area within its own boundaries suitable for its deposition. For
this reason, the capital co-operates with communities in its agglomeration to use their
areas for waste deposition purposes.  In the region this and other interactions in waste
management  well demonstrate the mutual dependency existing between the capital
city and its surrounding area.
In the capital itself the general state of the environment has become a veritable
bottleneck of urban development. On the list of the city’s problems air pollution and
sewage disposal are the most acute problems, followed by the lack of green areas in
the overcrowded inner city districts. The surrounding densely populated agglomera-
tion is of an agro-industrial nature. Moving away from the agglomeration, into rural
areas, the state of the environment mostly depends on whether in the specific com-
munity heavy industry, a dense transport network, agriculture or significant natural
resources dominate.
The production and collection of communal solid waste is characterised by the
following facts in the case study region:
• In the capital the quantity of solid communal waste collected in the frame-
work of public service is approximately 4 million cubic metres per annum.
During the nineties the capital’s population decreased by ten per cent which
also reduced the quantity of urban waste in Budapest. Organised collection of
waste covers almost 100 per cent of the capital. Hungary’s only communal
solid waste incinerator operates here, processing 60% of the solid communal
waste collected in the city. At the beginning of the nineties four landfills op-
erated in the area of the capital  but these all became full and were closed
down. Since then  some 40% of the capital’s communal waste has been de-
posited in landfills in the surrounding Pest county.
• The surrounding Pest county produces an annual amount of solid communal
waste of 1.7 million cubic metres, which increased in the course of the nine-
ties. The organised collection of waste is developing dynamically in the
county but the service still does not cover every settlement.
The following facts characterise industrial waste production in the region:
• Hazardous waste. Companies are obliged to report the production of hazard-
ous wastes and thus there is accessible data about their production. Produc-
tion of hazardous waste fell significantly between 1993 and 1997 both in Bu-
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dapest (from 600,000 tonnes/year to 200,000 tonnes/year), and in Pest county
(from 400,000 tonnes/year to 75,000 tonnes/year). 3
• Non-hazardous industrial waste. This category of industrial waste can be
estimated to be 1,660,000 tonnes/year in Budapest and 780,000 tonnes/year in
Pest county.
Table 2
SWOT analysis of the Central Hungary Region’s communal solid waste
management
Strengths Weaknesses
Well-organised solid communal
waste collection in Budapest
Improving solid waste collection in
Pest county.
Recently established regional land-
fills.
Complex and significant pollution arising from the city’s role as a capital
and the central role it plays in the transport infrastructure – (Budapest
and its Agglomeration).
Lack of selective waste collection - (Region).
The region is typified by the continuous practice of dumping waste at ille-
gal, uncontrolled sites and a high number of illegal waste dumps (Pest
county).
Many legally operated landfills do not conform to the basic hygiene re-
quirements (Region).
The  problem of special waste (e.g. car batteries, batteries) partly unsolved
(Region).
The local governments’ tight budget hinders the enforcement of a number of
environmental considerations – (Region).
Poor awareness of the environment – (Region).
Opportunities Threats
Spreading selective waste collec-
tion.
Developing integrated waste man-
agement through national and
ISPA financing.
Developing the waste utilization
industry.
Organising collection of hazardous
household waste.
Spreading household composting.
Illegal waste dumps pose a health hazard.
Illegal practice of dumping sewage sludge in landfills maintained for solid
waste.
The air pollution impacts of waste incineration cause conflicts between local
governments. (Affected districts and communities in the Agglomera-
tion took legal steps against the city of Budapest).
Conflicts between local governments due to their underused landfills which
became obsolete due to competitive investments in nearby communi-
ties (The region’s various subregions).
Conflicts from outside Pest county due to the waste coming to the county’s
landfills.
Source: compiled by the authors based on interviews made during the ADAPT research, also using the following
two documents: Közép-Magyarország [Central Hungary] (2001) and Pest Megye [Pest County] (2001).
THE SOCIAL NETWORK
In the course of the interviews the actors were asked to give e detailed accounts
of their social network. One important criterion of the success of the waste manage-
                                                
3 Category changes also played a role in the large-scale reduction.
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ment policy is the co-operation of a wide range of actors in its implementation. In
this policy area, too, the harmonised action of autonomous actors is an important
condition of environmental performance and appears to be the only behaviour pattern
that can be followed in the future. A good example of this is the compulsion to co-
operate of local governments as only in this manner can economical plant sizes be
created for their waste management investments.
The research has assessed the network which arose in the course of administra-
tive and market coordination: long lasting relationships of ownership, subcontractor-
ship and between service providers and their customers. Also  projects initiated
jointly by stakeholders for a fixed period were taken into consideration, some of
them creating more or less regular, occasional, formal and informal relations between
the investigated stakeholders. The raw relational data gained from the interviews was
quantitatively assessed and processed using the standard Social Network Analysis
method by computer application using UCINET 6.0 software.
Determining features of the social network created by the waste management
actors of the Central Hungary Region were as follows:
The quantitative analysis revealed that the majority of relations fall into two
groups.
• One part of the relations can be interpreted in the market, supply and
demand paradigm. The most typical demand side actors are regional
local governments, while on the supply side there are the waste man-
agement service providers.
• Another set of relationships  is of a bureaucratic nature: e.g. such are
the relations between environmental protection agencies and all other
actors subject to the regulations.
One of the interesting results of the analysis is that in the centre of the network
relations between the most significant supply and demand actors are rich: their own-
ership-, regulation- or customer relations have a strengthening or balancing impact
on each other. Such an actor is, for instance, the capital’s waste management com-
pany. In comparison there are smaller local governments or waste management com-
panies on the periphery of the network which are confined to  a simple clear-cut role
on the demand or on the  supply side of waste manegement services and  characteris-
tically develop a poorer network of relations.
Further characteristics of the network:
• Density. The network’s density shows how rich or poor the actors’ network
is. As expected, the density of relations is rather uneven if  the different
groups of waste management actors are compared. The most dense is the
subnetwork comprising government sector institutions, publicly owned waste
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treatment companies and their trade associations as well as of the largest pri-
vate-owned waste treatment companies with their numerous subsidiaries, and
customer and subcontractor relations.
• Degree of centrality. Centrality indicators are intended to reveal how deeply
an actor is embedded in the network of relations and how centralised the net-
work is, i.e. how dominant a role its centre and subcentres play. Asymmetric
relations are typical of the waste management networks of the case study re-
gion. Actors in the centre of the network, such as the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment and the region’s Environmental Protection Agency, were mentioned
by name by many respondents, while these institutions  themselves only
highlighted their most important administrative relations. On the other hand,
local actors mentioned relations of a broader range compared to how often
they were mentioned by others. The network of relations shows the phe-
nomenon that landfills of a subregional or regional attraction are a scarce re-
source. This means that their operators, and private and public owners are
embedded more deeply in the waste management network, that is these or-
ganisations have a more central role in the region’s waste management mar-
ket than other communities or companies without a landfill.
• Structural equivalence. The aim of this calculation is to reveal groups of
similar structure among the actors as regards their relations. In the region ex-
amined the algorithm seeking structural equivalences revealed the following
four groups: (1) The first group comprises actors with strong relations ac-
counting for half of the sample. The density of relations within this group is
about twice as dense than  the density of relations within or between any
other blocks. The members of this group are central (national) administrative
institutions, the capital city and a few communities and companies which
have easy access to subregional landfills. (2) The second group contains the
bulk of waste management companies. The web of relationships of these
companies within the sample are relatively poor. They are  strongly con-
nected to their client communities but their relations between each other are
weak, which can be explained by the fierce competition in the market of
waste management services. (3) The third group of actors consists of impor-
tant regional public actors such as the implementation organ of the Regional
Development Council and Pest county as well as the trade association of
publicly owned waste management companies. (4) The fourth group only in-
cludes local governments and their subregional associations. They only con-
nect to each other horizontally if they are neighbours or use a landfill owned
by another local government, or if they belong to the same subregional asso-
ciation. Their vertical connections, however, with the third group, county and
regional organs, are strong.
Based on the above analyis there is a phenomenon worthy of attention. While
within the region on the one hand, the capital’s institutions belong to the first group
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representing the most dense network, where organs with a national influence can also
be found, on the other hand the system of relations for institutions representing the
region and the county is different from the above and forms a separate group. Thus
while the capital city depends strongly on surrounding areas regarding  the physical
processes of waste management,  the institutional network of waste management
shows a very different picture: the capital and the few communities and waste man-
agement enterprises involved in the capital’s  service are distinctly separated from
the  institutions, local governments and enterprises of the region’s remaining areas.
The reason for the lack and undeveloped nature of the relations is often that the
civil culture in Hungary concerning the environment is relatively undeveloped and
cannot be compared to the level of self-conscious environment-aware behaviour ob-
servable in Western Europe. The amount of illegally dumped waste is very high in
Hungary, which is a reliable indicator of the deficiencies of social capital, i.e. the
willingness to co-operate and the level of consciousness of  citizens. Compared to the
infrastuctural investments being made in Hungary with EU co-financing, PR cam-
paigns on any waste management topic, including selective waste collection or fights
against illegal dumps could be made significantly cheaper. In this area, however,
there is a significant lagging behind and this disadvantage has not been eliminated
through EU aid programmes either.
Conflicts between the actors. Waste management policy is not only typified by
co-operation between the various actors but also by conflicts and competition.  Euro-
peanisation restructured conflicts as well as mechanisms for their solution in the area
of waste management. The Central Hungary Region and within it Budapest are dif-
ferent from the other regions inasmuch as inter-communal and inter-sectoral conflicts
related to waste management are sharper here. A part of waste conflicts are of a mar-
ket protection nature. The opening of the country’s borders was not immediately
followed by the free flow of the so-called green list (non-hazardous) waste. For in-
stance, entrepreneurs’ worries regarding the impact of exports of iron waste on the
raw material supply of Hungarian steel production were listened to in governmental
administration and the resulting measures have created substantial business for metal
recycling companies.
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Table 3
Conflicts and tensions between the different waste management actors in
Hungary
Causes and their EU aspects Ensuing conflicts and tensions
Conflict over resources on a macro level, as the implementa-
tion  of all EU environmental instructions amounts to more
than 10% of Hungary’s GDP.
EU harmonisation of environmental protec-
tion legislation, growing complexity of envi-
ronmental tasks
Conflict over resources on the level of applying the law, as
environmental agencies cannot cope with increasing tasks due
to lack of manpower and expertise.
The government and the EU co-finance land-
fills and other waste management infrastruc-
ture within the ISPA programme, whose bene-
ficiaries are public institutions.
Conflicts of a NIMBY (not in my back yard) and PIMBY (put
in my back yard) nature over the deposition of waste between
local governments, and between civil organisations and waste
management companies. Procedural conflicts due to unregu-
lated Public-Private Partnership. Infrastructure financed from
public funds creates competition for landfills established by
purely private investment. Competitive conflicts between pri-
vately and publicly owned service providers for the local
government market and investment sources.
The EU only supports waste management
systems of regional significance.
Due to this, trends to centralise waste management are typi-
cal, the landfills will become ever larger, and an increasing
amount of waste has to be transported between communities.
This trend reorganises the spatial structure of the flow of
waste and creates new relationships of dependency between
communities.
Continuing debate on the optimal treatment of
waste, which is influenced by the EU regula-
tions (incineration, landfills, recycling, etc.)
Trade and local groups with opposing interests develop. For
example, conflicts between communities over pollution
caused by waste incineration dependent on prevailing winds.
Illegal dumping in public areas: one of the
signs of the weak implementation of harmo-
nised EU regulations.
This results in conflicts between the environmental agencies
and local governments on the one hand, and households and
companies on the other.
The majority of legal landfills does not satisfy
EU environmental, technical and health re-
quirements. Their continued use is one of the
signs of the weak implementation of EU
regulations.
This results in conflicts between landfill owners and operators
(mainly local governments) on the one hand, and environ-
mental agencies on the other.
Local governments transfer responsibility for
communal waste management to private and
semi-private (local government-owned) com-
panies. Landfills in public ownership are for
financial reasons usually operated by PPPs.
There are financial reasons for this but the EU
also supports this institutional arrangement.
Disputes related to procedural rules, conflicts over contractual
conditions, waste fees and collection methods.
The time schedule for the solution of various
environmental tasks (e.g. sewage treatment
and waste management) depends on local cir-
cumstances, but EU obligations and resources
influence the order as well.
Conflicts between groups of various business interests which
influence public affair decisions.
Selective waste collection is a legal harmoni-
sation obligation, but it is only profitable for
certain types of waste (metals, paper).
Conflicts between local governments, profit-oriented service
providers and environmental interest associations over plans
for the financing of the selective collection of waste.
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